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SYMPOSIUM ON ABOLISHING CIVIL MARRIAGE:
AN INTRODUCTION
Edward Stein*
The institution of marriage is venerable both because it has existed
for a long time and because of the role it plays in our culture. In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court, in the context of
discussing “the notions of privacy surrounding . . . marriage”1 as they
related to a state law regulating contraception, said:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.2

The venerable institution of marriage has a distinctive Janus-faced
character, both in the past and in the present: it is at once both public
and private; it is contractual in nature and yet it creates a civic legal
status that has implications for third parties. In 1927, the Supreme
Court described marriage’s unusual character as follows:
[W]hilst marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions of
courts a civil contract—generally to indicate that it must be founded
upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious
ceremony for its solemnization—it is something more than a mere
contract. The consent of the parties is of course essential to its
existence, but when the contract to marry is executed by the
marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot
change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or
entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with
marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Program in Family Law, Policy and Bioethics,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. B.A., Williams College; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. (in
Philosophy), M.I.T. The symposium that this essay introduces was organized by the Program in
Family Law, Policy and Bioethics with the support of the Gloria and Stanley Plesent Lecture
Fund and the Cardozo Law Review. Thanks to Alan Weiler for his support and to Josh Andrix for
his research assistance.
1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
2 Id.
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parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for
it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress.3

Marriage today retains this distinctive legal character and a cultural
significance, but marriage as a social and legal institution has undergone
substantial changes over the last one hundred years. These changes
involve the extent of gender asymmetries in marriage, the ease of
dissolving a marriage, the legality and social acceptance of interracial
marriage, and the connections among sexual activity, marriage, and
procreation. Specifically, over the past hundred or so years, gender
roles in marriage have changed dramatically. Whereas married women
at one time could not own property4 and inheritance laws once treated
married men and married women differently,5 today legally created and
enforced gender asymmetries in family law have been mostly
eliminated.6 Additionally, over the years, it has become easier (and
more common) to get divorced in the United States, as evidenced by the
shift from a primarily fault-based divorce regime, in which one spouse
had to show that he or she was wronged by the other spouse in order to
get a divorce, to a no-fault divorce regime, in which fault is no longer
an issue with respect to allowing the dissolution of a marriage.7 Also,
most states in the United States, at some time, prohibited people of
different races from marrying,8 while all states now allow interracial
marriages.9 Despite dramatic changes regarding who may marry, the
benefits and duties of marriage, the rules for dissolving marriage, and
the social assumptions relating to marriage, this institution has survived
3
4

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1927).
See, e.g., MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
(1986).
5 See, e.g., CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT (1987).
6 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a state law that allowed
a husband to unilaterally alienate community property of the marriage violated equal protection
because it constituted sex discrimination); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a state
law under which husbands but not wives may be required to pay alimony similarly violated equal
protection). But cf. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that different requirements for
citizenship based on whether citizen parent was the applicant’s mother or father did not violate
the equal protection clause).
7 See, e.g., NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 79
(2000); J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1997).
8 There are twelve exceptions. Specifically, Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Wisconsin, Kansas, New Mexico, and Washington
never had laws restricting interracial marriage. The last three prohibited interracial marriages
when they were territories, but repealed such laws when they became states. The District of
Columbia also never prohibited interracial marriages. See PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE
COURT I LOVE MY WIFE 253-54 (2002).
9 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional laws prohibiting interracial
marriages).
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and thereby proven to be remarkably adaptable and supple.10
In the last decade or so, there have been rumblings of another
dramatic change for marriage. A legal and political battle has emerged
around the recognition of relationships between persons of the same
sex. Lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and their allies have argued in courts
and in legislatures that their relationships deserve legal recognition.11
Opponents of access to marriage for same-sex couples have proposed
state and federal laws and amendments to state and federal constitutions
in order to block some or all recognition of same-sex relationships.12
Although there are some who have tried to take legal actions to
resist this trend,13 lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are building families
not just by entering relationships, but, in increasing numbers, they are
raising children. If the elimination of gender asymmetries in marriage
and the move to no-fault divorce are two “revolutions” in family law in
this country, the recognition of same-sex relationships and families may
well be a third. On the cusp of this revolutionary moment in family
law, it is not surprising for scholars to ask deep and foundational
questions about marriage and the state’s role in relation to it.
The two main papers for this symposium are written by my
colleagues Ed Zelinsky and Daniel Crane. Both of them argue for the
abolition of civil marriage, decoupling the contractual and the civil
aspects of marriage. Ed Zelinsky argues that deregulating marriage
would be better for marriage because, doing so would create a
marketplace for alternative marriage contracts created by non-state
actors. Creating this marketplace for marriage contracts would have the
virtue, Zelinsky argues, of strengthening marriage and marriages. He
further argues that the abolition civil marriage would have few, if any,
10 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States
Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 663 (2004).
11 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
12 As of this writing, 39 states have either passed laws or amended their constitutions (or done
both) to prohibit same-sex marriages, to deny recognition of same-sex marriages from other
jurisdictions, and/or to deny recognition of other types of same-sex relationships. See, e.g.,
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Marriage Measures in the United States (Nov.
15, 2005), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf; Andrew
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 2143 (2005). In 1996, the “Defense of Marriage Act,” which defines marriage as
between one man and one woman and says no state shall be required to recognize a same-sex
marriage from another jurisdiction, became federal law. Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). Various federal constitutional
amendments that would prohibit same-sex marriage have also been proposed. See, e.g., Stein,
supra note 10, at 613 n.1 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2005) (prohibiting homosexuals from adopting). This
law was upheld in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 358
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
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substantive deleterious effects and that this legal change would not be as
radical as it might seem. Dan Crane reaches the conclusion that we
should abolish civil marriage from a religion-based argument. He
argues that under the Judeo-Christian tradition, marriage is a spiritual
relationship between two people that is best left alone by the state. He
describes the benefits of allowing religious institutions and other nonstate institutions to take care of marriage. Neither Zelinsky nor Crane
would abolish the social institution of marriage and, on their views,
most of the social practices around marriage would be unaltered by their
proposals. Further, neither claims that their proposals eliminate the
state’s involvement with married persons. Although at one level neither
paper is concerned with marriage equality for lesbian, gay men and
bisexuals,14 both papers are written against the current social, political,
and legal context in which equal access to marriage by same-sex
couples is part of the “culture war.”15
Is it appropriate that the debate about marriage equality for
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals provides an occasion for proposals to
abolish civil marriage? Debates about interracial marriages did not
produce similar reflections on whether to abolish civil marriage,
although some early feminist scholars and others who critiqued gender
asymmetries in marriage did argue for the abolition of marriage.16
Questioning civil marriage, the public policies that support it, the
restrictions on it, and the benefits and obligations that flow from it is an
important and appropriate project for legal scholars. The subject of this
symposium, although perhaps spawned by questions about same-sex
marriage, is orthogonal to those questions.
Zelinsky and Crane each bring a unique perspective to the question
of whether civil marriage should be abolished in part because neither is
a specialist in family law: Zelinksy’s primary scholarly interest
concerns tax,17 while Crane’s primary scholarly interest is in antitrust
law.18 Their different scholarly backgrounds and the associated
disciplinary frameworks provide them with alternative lenses for
examining civil marriage. Perhaps as a consequence of their alternative
disciplinary perspectives, a theme that runs through all three
commentaries, especially those by Charles Reid and Carol Sanger,19 is
14 That is, however, a central focus of Nancy Knauer’s commentary on the papers of Crane
and Zelinsky. See Nancy Knauer, A Marriage Skeptic Responds to the Pro-Marriage Proposals
to Abolish Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261 (2006).
15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16 See, e.g., SIMONE DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans. & ed., 1953).
17 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451
(2004).
18 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2005).
19 Charles Reid, And the State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in Recognizing
Marriage?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1277 (2006); Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27
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that the new legal regimes that would evolve under their proposals
would not adequately replace current family law, in which civil
marriage plays a central role. All three commentators and I, as the
convener of this symposium, however, agree that the two symposium
papers are provocative and raise important questions, questions that are
especially ripe given the current revolutionary moment in family law
and questions that demand critical engagement.

CARDOZO L. REV. 1311 (2006).

